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ABSTRACT 
A quantitative risk assessment of onboard hydrogen-powered vehicle storage, exposed to a fire, is 
performed. The risk is defined twofold as a cost of human life per vehicle fire, and annual fatality rate 
per vehicle. The increase of fire resistance rating of the storage tank is demonstrated to drastically reduce 
the risk to acceptable level. Hazard distances are calculated by validated engineering tools for blast wave 
and fireball, which follow catastrophic tank rupture in a fire, act in all directions and have larger hazard 
distances compared to jet fire. The fatality cash value, probabilities of vehicle fire and failure of 
thermally activated pressure relief device are taken from published sources. A vulnerability probit 
function is employed to calculate probability of emergency operations’ failure to control fire and prevent 
tank rupture. The risk is presented as a function of fire resistance rating of onboard storage. 
Keywords:  hydrogen safety, quantitative risk assessment, onboard hydrogen storage, blast wave and 
fireball, fire resistance rating, socio-economics 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Hydrogen hazards 
Due to unique hydrogen properties, its safety characteristics are quite different from those of commonly 
used fuels such as gasoline and natural gas. The low density of hydrogen (14 times lighter than air) 
makes it buoyant and inherently safer than other fuels in the open atmosphere and well-ventilated areas. 
Because of buoyancy hydrogen disperses fast in the open atmosphere to concentrations below the lower 
flammability limit and only a small fraction of released hydrogen would contribute to combustion if 
ignited [1]. Lower minimum ignition energy and a wider flammability range (4-75% by volume), 
however, make hydrogen more susceptible to ignition. Hydrogen is not more dangerous nor safer 
compared to other fuels [2]. Safety of hydrogen systems and infrastructure fully depends on how 
professionally it is handled at the design stage and afterwards [3]. The findings of empirical studies of 
public engagement [4] indicate that, while knowledge of hydrogen is limited, attitudes are agnostic. 
People are keen to learn more about hydrogen energy technologies, but reluctant to express explicit 
approval – or outright rejection – until more information is available about the relative costs, benefits 
and risks compared to existing systems. It was confirmed [4] that to be accepted by public as an emerging 
technology, the risk associated with hydrogen-powered transport must be less than, or at least equal to 
that of today’s fossil fuel transport. These are reasons the authors engaged in this study. 
1.2 Onboard storage of hydrogen 
Onboard compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH2) storage for hydrogen-powered vehicles is designed for 
typical operating pressures 35 MPa and 70 MPa. Type III (aluminium liner) and IV (polymer liner) 
composite tanks are accepted for onboard CGH2 storage due to their light weight and exceptional 
mechanical strength characteristics. Type IV tank is made of a high-density polyethylene liner (to limit 
permeation to regulated level), which is over-wrapped with a carbon fibre reinforced polymer (epoxy 
resin) to bear the pressure load of CGH2. Unfortunately, light weight and mechanically strong composite 
tanks degrade under a thermal load such as fire. The fire resistance rating (FRR), i.e. time from the start 
of fire to catastrophic rupture of tank (in conditions of thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD) 
failure to operate, or its blockage, in an accident), of current thermally unprotected tanks is about 6-
12 min [5, 6]. The European Regulations on type-approval of hydrogen vehicles require TPRD to be 
installed on hydrogen onboard tanks to release its content in a fire event and therefore to prevent 
catastrophic tank rupture. However, TPRD activation and safe hydrogen blowdown are impossible in 
some accident scenarios, e.g. in the case of a fire affecting only the localised area of a tank far from 
TPRD, or when a vehicle design does not exclude a blockage of the TPRD sensing element in jammed 
parts of the vehicle during a road accident. In these cases, a tank can experience a strong and fast thermal 
load from a fire and thus progressing degradation of the composite tank wall. Rupture of a tank equipped 
with TPRD in CNG-vehicles fires has been repeatedly reported, e.g. [7]. This is probably the most 
important current safety concern for hydrogen-powered vehicles. Explosion-free in a fire composite tank 
(infinite FRR), which is currently under development at Ulster University, would be a solution to 
drastically increase safety of hydrogen vehicles and gain public acceptance of the technology.  
1.3 Relevant safety studies 
The interest of OEM in hydrogen-powered vehicles has stimulated research into safety of onboard 
hydrogen storage, including studies on fire and explosion hazards and performance of CGH2 tanks in a 
fire with TPRD being removed [5, 6, 8]. The experimentally observed hazards from a storage tank failure 
in a fire, i.e. pressure effects of a blast wave and thermal effects of a fireball, were documented [5, 6] 
and analysed [9, 10].  The same experimental data [5, 6] were recently analysed in a study [11], where 
the contribution of combustion into the blast wave strength was demonstrated and accounted for the first 
time, making prediction of hazard distances more accurate. The effect of different thermal protection of 
a tank on its FRR was studied [12]. The development of the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) 
model to evaluate the effect of intumescent paint on FRR of Type IV tank in a fire is described [13]. 
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There are studies on quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of hydrogen refuelling stations and storage 
infrastructure, e.g. [14], and relevant tools, e.g. HyRAM toolkit by Sandia National Laboratories [15]. 
The HyRAM focus is currently on the thermal effects from jet fires and pressure effects from 
deflagrations. One may calculate fatal accident rate, average individual risk, and potential loss of life 
from jet fires and deflagrations only. HyRAM is still under development and there are hazards yet to be 
included in the consequences analysis part of the toolkit, e.g. hazards from blast wave and fireball in the 
case of catastrophic tank rupture in a fire. These two hazards are identified as the main hazards in our 
study. Work [14] suggested a risk-informed approach for the selection of a leak diameter to establish 
the safety distances in National Fire Protection Association standards NFPA 2 “Hydrogen technologies 
code” [16] and NFPA 55 “Compressed gas and cryogenic fluid code” [17]. Their study involved the 
analysis of frequency and risk of leakage for typical hydrogen facilities, and the cumulative frequency 
of a system leakage.  Due to limited hydrogen-specific leakage data, a Bayesian statistics approach was 
exploited to generate leakage frequencies from other non-hydrogen sources. In 2005 the authors of [18] 
performed a QRA study for a gaseous hydrogen storage tank with regards to unconfined vapor cloud 
explosion and fireball. The “functional modelling” approach was introduced in [19] and it was proposed 
as an efficient method for the high-level risk assessment of hydrogen supply chain. The role of 
uncertainty in hydrogen emerging technologies was introduced and a step-by-step investigation 
methodology to quantify the uncertainty was attempted in study [20]. Safety barrier diagrams technique 
was introduced in [21] as a complimentary tool for both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment of 
hydrogen technologies and it was followed by the development of the software “SafetyBarrierManager” 
in the Technical University of Denmark [22].  
In [23] a risk assessment framework for onboard hydride-based hydrogen storage systems for light-duty 
vehicles was proposed and uncertainties involved were discussed. There are other hydrogen related risk 
assessment related studies including, but not limited to, an overview of risk assessment studies on 
hydrogen safety [24]; discussion on challenges towards hydrogen technology risk assessment [25, 26]; 
risk assessment of hydrogen and CNG refuelling stations [27]; quantitative risk assessment of the mobile 
hydrogen refuelling station [28]; presenting a hydrogen risk assessment methodology [29];, proposing 
and implementing a risk assessment methodology during the production of hydrogen in an oil refinery 
[30]; proposing and modelling of a risk matrix framework of cryogenic liquid hydrogen filling systems 
[31]; 3D risk management on hydrogen installations [32]; a grid-based risk assessment method in 
hydrogen refuelling stations [33] and performance-based design of refuelling stations [34]. 
ISO TC197 Hydrogen Technologies has recently introduced a term “hazard distance” as “a distance 
from the source of hazard to a determined (by physical or numerical modelling, or by a regulation) 
physical effect value (normally, thermal or pressure) that may lead to a harm condition ranging from 
“no harm” to “max harm” to people, equipment or environment” [35]. Hazard distance is the 
transparent “consequence only” deterministic distance that will be applied in this study as an alternative 
to separation or safety distance currently used by industry [35].  
The authors of [36], [37] studied the damage probability of storage tanks exposed to a fire and its 
relationship with FRR. The probit function was employed to estimate the escalation probability (EP), 
i.e. the likelihood of emergency operations to fail to extinguish the initiating fire (leading to a tank 
rupture). The probit function gives the “inverse” computation associated with specified cumulative 
probability. The QRA methodology [36], [37] was used to assess the performance of fireproofing 
materials to protect a fuel storage tank from a fire. The authors of [36], [37] used the general equation 
from the probit analysis of [38] which assumes log-normal distribution: 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 ∙ ln(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹),           (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌 represents the probit function, 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 are constants, and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is measured in minutes. The 
probability of emergency actions to fail can be calculated as a function of 𝑌𝑌 through the cumulative 
expression for a normal Gaussian probability distribution [38, 39]: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 1
𝜎𝜎√2𝜋𝜋
∙ ∫ 𝑒𝑒−
𝑢𝑢2
2 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑌𝑌−5
−∞
.    (2) 
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However, there would be complications with integration of Equation (2) and finding of 𝜎𝜎 - the standard 
deviation of the emergency response time value to calculate 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎
 and the mean 
value of emergency response time 𝜇𝜇. In our study, instead of integration of Equation (2), we use the 
error function (erf) for its solution following [40]: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 1
2
�1 + erf (𝑌𝑌−5
√2
)�.    (3) 
In study [37] the authors applied regression method to determine coefficients “𝑎𝑎” and “𝑏𝑏” for the probit 
function in Equation (1) observing real life data available for the deployment of efficient emergency 
operations in a refinery. Only 10% of the tank cooling process could have started in less than 5 min, and 
90% of cases in less than 20 min. Thus, the failure probability for 5 min response time of fire brigade is 
90% and for 20 min it is 10%. Value of probit function Y was estimated from Equation (3) and totalled 
6.28 and 3.72 for 5 min and 20 min, respectively. The coefficients “𝑎𝑎” and “𝑏𝑏 ” were then calculated 
using Equation (1) as: 
𝑏𝑏 = (6.28 − 3.72) (ln(5) − ln(20))⁄ = −1.85  and  𝑎𝑎 = 6.28 − 𝑏𝑏 ∙ ln(5) = 9.25. 
Thus, the probit function for a scenario of fire brigade arriving at an accident scene with a hydrogen-
powered vehicle fire is defined here similar to [36, 37] as: 
𝑌𝑌 = 9.25 − 1.85 ∙ ln(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹).                                            (4)  
It is worth underlining here that the effect of safety barriers, i.e. thermal protection of onboard storage, 
on the reduction of the risk associated with a rupture of hydrogen storage tank, was not within the scope 
of previous studies.  
This paper aims to study the impact of an FRR of onboard storage on a level of risk and its acceptance 
for hydrogen-powered vehicles using QRA and its application to an example of roads in London. The 
QRA is carried out by employing publicly available data on FRR of onboard hydrogen storage, TPRD 
failure frequency, London population density and other data to evaluate the socio-economic impact of 
safety engineering on emerging hydrogen-powered transport. 
2.0 THE QRA METHODOLOGY 
Flowchart of the QRA methodology is shown in Fig. 1. The QRA output is a value of risk in terms of 
human fatality per vehicle per year (Fig. 1a), and in terms of cost of human loss per accident (Fig. 1b). 
The risk in terms of fatality per vehicle per year (Fig. 1a) is assessed using the frequency of accidents 
per vehicle per year. The consequence analysis aims to identify dominant hazards in an accident fire and 
their consequences, which are considered here only as fatality per accident. The risk in terms of the cost 
per accident (Fig. 1b) is assessed using analysis of probability of tank rupture in a fire, and the same 
consequence analysis, but is extended to account for the cost of life per accident. 
The first step in the consequence analysis is the identification of the key hazards relevant to the accident 
scenario with a high-pressure composite tank in a fire. They are identified, based on other studies at 
Ulster University, as a fireball and a blast wave following a catastrophic tank rupture in a fire. The 
detailed comparative analysis of different hazards, including jet fires from TPRD and projectiles 
emanating from a tank explosion, is out of the scope of this paper. It has been concluded that a key 
thermal hazard will occur due to a fireball but not a jet fire, and a key pressure hazard is produced due 
to a blast wave from a tank rupture but not a blast from a deflagration.  
The next step is the estimation of hazard distances at which pressure and thermal effects cause fatality, 
serious injury, slight injury, and where there is no harm from the fireball and blast wave. Here the hazard 
distances for blast wave and fireball were calculated using the validated engineering tools against 
experiments theory [11]. Current research at Ulster University has demonstrated that a thermal dose 
during the comparatively short duration of a fireball lifetime is not harmful unless a human is within the 
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fireball [41, 42]. To make things easier, in our QRA we neglect the non-fatal injury effects and assume 
that fatality occurs only when a human is resident inside a fireball. 
The techniques and tools mentioned above, including [11], are used to calculate the number of 
individuals who are affected to estimate the number of fatalities per accident as per flowchart in Fig. 1a, 
and the cost per accident as per flowchart in Fig. 1b. To this end, databases available through [43] and 
[44] are used to obtain the population density, measured in persons per m2, within the hazard zone, and 
to develop the cost metrics, i.e. cost per injury type (in this study for fatality only), respectively.
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Figure 1. The QRA methodology flowchart: (a) risk in terms of fatality per vehicle per year, (b) risk in terms of cost of human loss per accident with a 
hydrogen-powered vehicle.
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In the case of calculating risk as fatality per vehicle per year (Fig. 1a), the frequency analysis includes 
estimation of the initiating event (fire) frequency, TPRD failure, and calculation of the escalating 
probability of emergency operations failing to extinguish fire (EP) leading to a tank rupture in a fire. In 
this study, the initiating event frequency is calculated as a sum of frequencies for the following generic 
scenarios: a vehicle fire due to an accident [45, 46], a fire caused by leaking high-pressure fittings, 
valves or piping connections [47], and a fire while filling hydrogen/tow away [47]. The EP is obtained 
by exploiting the Equation (3) following [40] and Equation (4) following [36, 37]. The tank rupture 
frequency is calculated here by multiplying three parameters: initiating event frequency, TPRD failure 
probability, and EP. 
As demonstrated in Fig. 1b, when calculating the risk as a cost per accident, the TPRD failure probability 
and EP are calculated assuming that the initiating fire has already occurred.  
Finally, the risk in terms of fatality rate (fatality/vehicle/year) is calculated as a product of fatality per 
accident and frequency of an accident (Fig. 1a), and the risk in terms of an accident cost (£/accident) is 
obtained as a product of cost per accident and the tank rupture probability (Fig. 1b).  
3.0 EXAMPLE OF THE QRA APPLICATION 
3.1 Onboard storage parameters 
The onboard hydrogen storage volume of 62.4 litres, similar to an existing fuel cell car [48, 49] was 
selected in this QRA. The stored amount of hydrogen weights 2.514 kg at nominal working pressure of 
70 MPa.  
3.2 Consequence analysis 
Figure 2 shows the sequence of events for an accident which starts with the occurrence of at least one 
of three fire scenarios: the fire due to the car accident, fire due to high pressure (HP) fittings, connections 
or valves, and the fire while filling hydrogen/tow away.  
 
Figure 2. Sequence of events leading to a tank rupture in a fire resulting in blast wave and fireball. 
Considering the occurrence of accident in an open environment, it is known that the hydrogen release 
through initiation by the fire TPRD of a comparatively small diameter, which is the tendency for onboard 
hydrogen storage to exclude the pressure peaking phenomenon [50, 3], cannot cause serious harm as the 
flame is of a limited length and the buoyancy reduces hazard distance even further. By this reasoning 
these higher frequency lower consequences scenarios are eliminated from our analysis. Thus, we focus 
here on low frequency high consequence events, i.e. the rupture of a tank in a fire with the consequent 
blast wave and fireball [11]. The rupture of a tank occurs due to exposure of the tank to the initiating 
fire given that both safety barriers, i.e. TPRD initiation by the fire and the fire extinction by emergency 
actions, fail.  
For a 62.4 litre onboard storage tank at 70 MPa, the hazard distances for fatality, serious and slight injury 
due to a blast wave can be calculated as 1.68 m, 13.4 m and 76 m, respectively using the “under-vehicle” 
technique [51]. The areas corresponding to these hazard distances (diameters) are shown in Table 1. The 
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area of lower harm is calculated as the area within hazard distance for this type of harm, minus area for 
higher harm. 
Table 1. Hazard distances for the blast wave and fireball. 
Effect Blast wave hazard distance (m) 
Blast wave 
area (m2) 
Fireball hazard 
distance (m) 
Fireball 
area (m2) 
Area selected 
for QRA (m2) 
Fatality 1.68 9 35 962 962 
Serious Injury* 13.4 555 - - N/A 
Slight Injury* 76 17,573 - - N/A 
*  - for information only (not included in the present study). 
Due to the short duration of fireball, only fatalities resulting from humans being engulfed in a fire are 
considered in this study (the thermal dose for people outside the fireball is far below serious and slight 
injury levels for the few seconds duration of the fireball). The fatality hazard distance of a fireball is 
equal to its maximum radius, which should be calculated. For the considered hydrogen onboard storage, 
i.e. 62.4 litres tank at 70 MPa pressure [49, 48], two techniques were applied.  
The first technique is suggested by the authors and assumes a simplified calculation of a fireball size 
after a stand-alone tank rupture. The technique is a part of the methodology for the calculation of the 
blast wave decay after compressed gas vessel rupture [11] and hazard distances attributed to the blast 
parameters. According to the technique, the fireball size is calculated as a hemisphere occupied by 
combustion products resulting from complete combustion of released hydrogen in air (non-premixed 
turbulent combustion at contact surface occurs at stoichiometric concentration of reactants). This 
approach resulted in a fireball diameter of 13.5 m for the considered tank (62.4 L and 70 MPa) rupture. 
The estimated fireball size for stand-alone tank is then scaled for onboard tank (“under-vehicle” tank in 
terminology [11]) based on the experimental data [5, 6]. These tests were performed in the USA by 
Weyandt et al. in 2005-2006. The experimentally observed fireball size was 7.6 m and 24 m for stand-
alone and under-vehicle tanks respectively for storage pressures 35 MPa.  The fireball scaling factor is 
suggested to account for the difference in fireball diameters, (24 m and 7.6 m), and tank volumetric 
capacities (72.4 and 88 L), as: (24/7.6) ∙ (72.4/88)=2.6. Hence, the scaling of the fireball diameter for 
stand-alone tank 13.5 m (calculated above) to an onboard application results in the new fireball diameter 
13.5 m ∙ 2.6=35 m. The area covered by such a fireball is calculated as 𝐴𝐴=π𝑟𝑟2=3.14 ∙ (35 m / 2)2=962 
m2. 
The second technique is based on the use of empirical correlation [52] for a wide variety of explosives 
including hydrogen-air and rocket bipropellants, and is later applied for calculation of hydrogen fireball 
diameter  [9]: 
𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 = 7.93 ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓1 3⁄ ,     (5) 
where Df (m) is the diameter of the fireball, Wf (kg) is the mass of hydrogen gas (2.514 kg, [48]). Zalosh 
stated that the fireball diameter calculated by Equation (5) is only 40% of that observed in the test with 
under-vehicle (onboard) tank rupture [10]. Thus, calculated by the “scaled” Equation (5) fireball 
diameter (multiplied by 1/0.4= 2.5) our example is: 
𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 = 2.5 ∙ 7.93 ∙ 2.5141 3⁄ = 27 (𝑚𝑚). 
The diameter calculated by the second technique of 27 m (fireball area 570 m2) is about 30% less than 
the diameter of 35 m obtained by the first technique. The conservative value of fireball diameter of 35 
m is chosen for the calculation of risk in this study. Table 1 demonstrates that the fatality area of the 
fireball is larger than the fatality area of the blast wave. It is even larger than the serious injury area for 
the blast wave. The number of potential fatalities is estimated as:  
𝑁𝑁 = 𝑁𝑁0 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡,    (6) 
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where N0 represents the population density in the location of the accident and Aeffect is the area within 
the hazard distance. The location of an accident is assumed to be in London, hence the population density 
data, provided in [43], is applied to estimate N0 value. The possible decrease, e.g. due to people leaving 
the scene, or increase, e.g. due to help and rescue actions attempted by other people, of population 
density at the accident scene is not considered in further calculations. The mean value and standard 
deviation for the population distribution data was obtained as follows: 
𝑁𝑁0 = 1𝑒𝑒 ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡=1 ,    (7) 
𝜎𝜎 = �1
𝑒𝑒
∑ (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝑁𝑁0)2𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡=1 ,    (8) 
where 𝜎𝜎 (person/m2) is the standard deviation, 𝑛𝑛 (-) is the total number of available population density 
data for various locations in London, and 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 (person/m2) is the population density in location “i” in 
London. Accounting for all 626 locations available from Greater London Authority [43], the average 
population density 𝑁𝑁0 was calculated as 0.008 (person/m2) and based on [53] it is assumed that 1.5 
person are in the vehicle. Thus, the number of fatalities for catastrophic rupture of a tank was calculated 
as N=9.19 fatality/accident.  
Table 2 shows the cost of eliminating the risk from explosion used by UK’s Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) [44] and adopted in this study. Multiplying the cost of a fatality in Table 2 (£1,336,800 per 
fatality) by the number of fatalities (9.19 fatalities per accident) the cost of human loss associated with 
an accident with a hydrogen-powered vehicle with no thermally protected onboard storage is estimated 
as 12,289,202 £/accident. 
Table 2.  Cost benefit of eliminating the risk from explosion [44]. 
Effect Value (£/person) 
Fatality 1,336,800 
Serious injury* 207,200 
Slight injury* 300 
*  - for information only (not included in the present study). 
3.3 Frequency analysis 
3.3.1 Frequency of the initiating fire event  
The use of hydrogen as an energy carrier for vehicles is still under development. Thus, the number of 
hydrogen-powered vehicles in the market is currently very small compared to conventional fuel 
vehicles. This results in very low frequency of initiating fire events being obtained if relying on the 
statistical accident data associated with hydrogen-powered vehicles only. In our study it was assumed 
that the parameters relevant to assessing frequency of initiating fire events associated with hydrogen-
powered vehicles are equal to those of conventional fuel cars (Table 3). Frequency of fires due to a 
vehicle accident was estimated using data [45, 46]. Number of cars (row “1”) and number of car 
accidents (row “2”) in the UK were taken from [46] and the frequency of car accidents calculated as 8.57 ∙ 10−3 accidents/year (value of “2” divided by the value of “1”). The later value was then multiplied 
by the probability of a car accident leading to fire [45] and the frequency of the initial fire due to a car 
accident was thus calculated as 3.89 ∙ 10−5 fire/vehicle/year. The frequencies for the other two initiating 
fire scenarios were accepted from European FireComp project [47] and are shown in Table 3 too.  
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Table 3. Statistical data and calculated frequencies of initiating fire events. 
No. Probability or frequency Value 
Fires due to a car accident 
1 Number of cars [46] 3.11 ∙ 10+7 
2 Number of car accidents [46] 2.67 ∙ 10+5 
3 Frequency of car accidents (accident/year) 8.57 ∙ 10−3 
4 Probability of accident leading to fire [45] 4.54 ∙ 10−3 
5 Frequency of initiating fire (fire/vehicle/year) 3.89 ∙ 10−5 
Fires due to leaks of high-pressure fittings, valves and piping connections 
6 Frequency of initiating fire, [47] (fire/vehicle/year) 1.00 ∙ 10−3 
Fires due to hydrogen filling/tow away 
7 Frequency of initiating fire, [47] (fire/vehicle/year) 1.00 ∙ 10−6 
 
3.3.2 Failure probability of TPRD 
As yet there is no published information and data on the failure rate of TPRD for hydrogen-powered 
vehicles. The conservative characteristic value for the random mechanical failure probability of pressure 
relief devices (PRD) was proposed in the publicly available database NPRD [54] as 6.04 ∙ 10−3. This 
value was used to calculate TPRD failure probability in FireComp [47] risk assessment study by 
considering TPRD failure probability due to accident/fire conditions (0 for the engulfed fire and 0.5 for 
the localised fire). Similarly to FireComp project [47], the failure probability of TPRD is accepted here 
as (1 − 0) ∙ (6.04 ∙ 10−3) + 0 = 6.04 ∙ 10−3 and (1 − 0.5) ∙ (5.03 ∙ 10−1) + 0.5 = 5.03 ∙ 10−1 for 
engulfed fire and localised fire, respectively.  
3.3.3 Escalation probability (EP) 
For the FRR=8 min, which is a bare tank rupture time reported in [12], the use of Equations (3) and (4) 
[37], allow calculation of the EP value as 6.57 ∙ 10−1: 
𝑌𝑌 = 9.25 − 1.85 ∙ ln(8) = 5.4030      ⇒       𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 1
2
�1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 �5.4030−5
√2
�� = 6.57 ∙ 10−1. 
3.3.4 Frequency of tank rupture 
According to FireComp risk assessment study [47], the three accident scenarios are unlikely to 
occur simultaneously, and thus are mutually exclusive. Hence, the values for the initiating fire 
frequency in Eq. [9] are summed. Having the values for the initiating fire frequency (Section 3.3.1, 
Table 3), the failure probability of TPRD (Section 3.3.2), and EP (Section 3.3.3), the frequency of tank 
rupture (rupture/vehicle/year) can be calculated as:  
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 
�∑ (𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑡𝑡3𝑡𝑡=1 � ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹,    (9) 
where the (Initiating fire frequency)1, (Initiating fire frequency)2 and (Initiating fire frequency)3 
correspond to initiating fire due to a car accident, HP fittings/connections/valves, and hydrogen 
filling/tow away (see Table 3).  
For the scenario when onboard storage is fully engulfed in a fire, this frequency is equal to: 
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𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = [(3.89 ∙ 10−5) + (1.00 ∙ 10−3) + (1.00 ∙ 10−6)] ∙ (6.04 ∙ 10−3) ∙(6.57 ∙ 10−1) = 4.12 ∙ 10−6(𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒/𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟⁄ ), 
and for a localised fire, the catastrophic rupture frequency is: 
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = [(3.89 ∙ 10−5) + (1.00 ∙ 10−3) + (1.00 ∙ 10−6)] ∙ (5.03 ∙ 10−1) ∙(6.57 ∙ 10−1) = 3.41 ∙ 10−4(𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒/𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟⁄ ). 
Schematic illustration of events leading to the catastrophic tank rupture and corresponding frequencies 
are shown in Fig. 3 for a fully engulfing fire and in Fig. 4 for a localised fire. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency of a tank rupture in an engulfing fire. 
 
Figure 4. Frequency of a tank rupture in a localised fire. 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1  Effects of FRR on the risk value  
4.1.1 Risk in terms of fatality rate 
The risk of fatality per vehicle per year is calculated as 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝑁𝑁,                                                                                           (10) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 (rupture/vehicle/year) is calculated by Equation (9) and the number of 
fatalities 𝑁𝑁 (fatality/rupture) is calculated by Equation (6). The fatality rate strongly depends on a tank 
FRR, which may vary over a wide range depending on whether the tank is bare or thermally protected. 
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In this study, FRR of onboard hydrogen storage tank was adopted from recent fire tests [12] as FRR=8 
min for bare tank, and at least 111 minutes for a tank thermally protected by intumescent paint.  
Table 4 presents values of risk calculated for bare and thermally protected onboard storage tanks in cases 
of engulfing and localised fires. In the case of engulfing fire, the fatality rate for the bare tank and 
thermally protected tank is 3.79 ∙ 10−5 and 2.34 ∙ 10−10 (fatality/vehicle/year) respectively. According 
to [14, 55, 56], the acceptable risk for the third party (public) is 1.00 ∙ 10−5 (fatality/vehicle/year). Thus, 
for the selected conditions within made assumptions the risk for the bare tank is about three times more 
than the acceptable level of risk of 10−5. In the case of a localised fire, the risk for bare tank of 3.14 ∙10−3 (fatality/vehicle/year) is almost two orders of magnitude above the acceptable level of risk.  
Table 4. Risk for various FRR of onboard storage tank for engulfing and localised fire. 
Fire exposure type Thermal protection FRR, min Risk, fatality/vehicle/year 
Engulfing fire No (bare tank) 8 3.79 ∙ 10−5 Yes 111  2.34 ∙ 10−10 
Localised fire No (bare tank) 8* 3.14 ∙ 10−3 Yes 111* 1.93 ∙ 10−8 
*  - assumption.  
The QRA results in Table 4 for thermally protected tank demonstrate a drastic increase of hydrogen-
powered vehicle safety in terms of the risk. This is due to a longer time available to first responders to 
extinguish fire in the case of higher FRR. The radical decrease of fatality rate is observed. Thermal 
protection of onboard storage and increase of FRR to 111 minutes lowers the risk to a negligible value 
of 2.34 ∙ 10−10 fatality/vehicle/year for engulfing fire and 1.93 ∙ 10−8 fatality/vehicle/year for localised 
fire.  
Figures 5 and 6 present the fatality rate as a function of FRR of onboard hydrogen storage tank. For 
engulfing fire (Fig. 5), the risk for bare tank with FRR=8 min is about three times higher than the 
acceptable level (top of the blue area). The acceptable level of risk here is 1.00 ∙ 10−5 following previous 
studies [14, 55, 56]. The increase of FRR to 16.6 min reduces the risk for the case of engulfing fire to 
the acceptable level of 1.00 ∙ 10−5 and further increase of FRR lowers the risk even more, as expected. 
This underlines the importance of thermal protection of onboard storage. 
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Figure 5. Risk (fatality/vehicle/year) as a function of FRR (min) of onboard storage tank:  
engulfing fire. 
In a localised fire, the TPRD may be not affected by fire at all. This increases the probability of TPRD 
initiation failure and the risk is considerably higher compared to the case of engulfing fire (see Fig. 6). 
In the case of localised fire, the fatality rate for a bare tank with FRR=8 min is 3.14 ∙ 10−3 
(fatality/vehicle/year). This is two orders of magnitude higher than that in the case of engulfing fire, i.e. 3.79 ∙ 10−5 (fatality/vehicle/year). The increase of FRR for a localised fire gradually decreases the 
fatality rate until the risk reaches the acceptable level only at FRR=47 min. This implies a higher level 
of thermal protection of onboard storage, which should be applied in practice.  
Such FRR of hydrogen storage vessels is greater than that of any known experimentally observed FRR 
of unprotected vessels (typically 6-12 min). Various engineering solutions can be applied to increase 
FRR: additional heat detection means for initiation of TPRDs, various thermal protection techniques 
e.g. explosion-free in a fire safety technology for composite tanks [57], etc. 
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Figure 6. Risk (fatality/vehicle/year) as a function of FRR (min) of onboard storage tank:  
localised fire.  
4.1.2 Effect of hydrogen safety engineering (improved FRR) on accident cost  
To evaluate the effect of FRR on the cost of human loss in a hydrogen-powered vehicle accident with a 
fire, the following procedure was applied. According to the flowchart in Fig. 1b, the cost of fatality per 
vehicle accident with a fire is calculated as a function of fire EP, given TPRD has failed to operate or 
was blocked from the fire during the accident, and the cost associated with the number of fatalities is 
known (HSE value in our study). This means that for a bare tank with FRR=8 min (see Table 4) EP is 
calculated using Equations (2) and (3) as: 
𝑌𝑌 = 9.25 − 1.85 ∙ ln(8) = 5.4030   ⟹      𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 1
2
�1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 �5.403−5
√2
�� = 6.57 ∙ 10−1. 
It is important to mention again that for the calculation of the risk in term of cost per accident, the TPRD 
failure probability and EP are calculated assuming that the initiating fire has already occurred (Fig. 1b). 
Thus, in this case, the frequency of fire accident is not considered in Eq. (11). The cost associated with 
fatalities, in our case in an accident with the catastrophic rupture of a storage tank in a fire, is calculated 
as 12,289,202 £/accident (section 3.2). The probability of TPRD failure in cases of engulfing and 
localised fires are 6.04 ∙ 10−3 and 5.03 ∙ 10−1, respectively. Thus, the risk in terms of cost per accident 
(£/accident) is calculated as:  
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 = 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸),       (11) 
 will give the following values for engulfing and localised fires, respectively: 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 = 12,289,202 � £
𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
� ∙  (6.04 ∙ 10−3) ∙ (6.57 ∙ 10−1) = 48,733 � £
𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
�. 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 = 
 12,289,202 � £
𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
� ∙ (5.03 ∙ 10−1) ∙ (6.57 ∙ 10−1) = 4,034,165 � £
𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
�. 
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The cost of human loss for various FRR values can be obtained by using the same procedure as for the 
above case of FRR=8 min. Figures 7 and 8 represent graphically the cost as a function of FRR for 
engulfing and localised fire, respectively. For the engulfing fire, the cost drastically decreases with the 
increase of FRR and reaches a negligible value of £100 per accident for FRR=50 min.   
 
Figure 7. Effect of FRR of onboard storage on the cost of human loss: engulfing fire. 
Figure 8 shows that in the case of a localised fire the effect of FRR on the risk is more prominent. The 
cost descends quickly with the increase of FRR and falls to £12,500 per accident at FRR=47.0 min (at 
this value of FRR, the risk measured in fatality/vehicle/year reaches the acceptable level of 1.00 ∙ 10−5). 
Here it should be mentioned again that the costs for a vehicle damage or damage to natural and the built 
environment are not included in this QRA exercise.  
  
Figure 8. Effect of FRR of onboard storage on the cost of human loss: localised fire. 
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4.2  Towards uncertainty analysis 
The detailed uncertainty analysis is not in the scope of this study and the authors envisage  undertaking 
a separate study and publishing the results. The uncertainty sources comprise the assumptions made in 
the absence of statistical data for emerging technologies, the limiting number of scenarios in the QRA, 
and the use of models or correlations for assessment of hazard distances which have own uncertainties.  
More sources of uncertainties are: 
 Assumption that TPRD failure probability is equal to that of PRD, 
 Uncertainty of the model for blast wave overpressure as a function of distance, 
 Uncertainty of the technique to calculate the upper limit for fireball diameter, 
 Uncertainty of the population distribution over various areas, 
 Assumption that population density in vicinity of a burning hydrogen-powered vehicle will not 
decrease or increase and remain steady under normal conditions. 
It must also be mentioned that the adopted experimental values of FRR in this study were obtained for 
a tank of specific design, and is likely to vary for tanks of different size, volume, maximum allowable 
working pressure (MAWP), etc.  
The overall analysis of uncertainties is currently hampered by the lack of data. Only the effect of 
uncertainty of population density is assessed here. Using the population data available for London from 
[43] and the assumption that the population data is log-normally distributed [58, 59],  and for the natural 
logarithm of the data set, the mean value of population density logarithm 𝜇𝜇=-5.0270 and its standard 
deviation 𝜎𝜎=0.6820 were obtained through Eqs. (7) and (8), respectively. Basically, when a data set is 
log-normally distributed, its natural logarithm values have the normal distribution with probability 
density function [40]: 
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = ∫ 1
√2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎2
exp �− (𝑥𝑥−𝜇𝜇)2
𝜎𝜎2
�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥.𝑥𝑥
−∞
         (12) 
To integrate Eq. (12), the error function may be used similar to that in Section 1.3:  
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 1
2
�1 + erf (𝑥𝑥−𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎√2
)�.          (13) 
To demonstrate the effect of uncertainty of population density in terms of fatality per vehicle per year 
(Fig. 1a) the QRA methodology is applied here for 5% percentile of population density, mean value and 
95% percentile of population density. Using Eq. (13) with the above values of 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜎𝜎 the 5% percentile 
for the population density is obtained as 0.00201 person/m2 and 95% percentile as 0.021 person/m2 
(mean population density value is 𝑁𝑁0 = 0.008 person/m2).  
Table 5 presents the sensitivity of the risk value to the population density distribution in London. To 
reach the safe level of the risk for 95% of hydrogen-powered car accidents with fires across London, 
FRR=47.03 min (associated with mean value of population density) is not sufficient and FRR must be 
increased to the value of 52.9 min.  
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Table 5. Uncertainty of the risk (fatality/vehicle/year) as a function of uncertainty of population 
density distribution for hydrogen-powered vehicle accident with a localised fire. 
FRR 
(min) 
Risk (fatality/vehicle/year) 
Risk for 5% lower 
bound population 
density 
Risk for mean value of 
population density 
0.008 person/m2 
Risk for 95% upper 
bound population 
density 
8 7.18 ∙ 10−4 3.14 ∙ 10−3 6.63 ∙ 10−3 
10 5.42 ∙ 10−4 2.37 ∙ 10−3 5.01 ∙ 10−3 
20 1.07 ∙ 10−4 4.69 ∙ 10−4 9.91 ∙ 10−4 
30 2.25 ∙ 10−5 9.83 ∙ 10−5 2.08 ∙ 10−4 
35.6 𝟏𝟏.𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 ∙ 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎−𝟓𝟓 4.38 ∙ 10−5 9.25 ∙ 10−5 
47.0 2.22 ∙ 10−6 𝟏𝟏.𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 ∙ 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎−𝟓𝟓 2.05 ∙ 10−5 
52.9 1.09 ∙ 10−6 4.76 ∙ 10−6 𝟏𝟏.𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 ∙ 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎−𝟓𝟓 
 
Figure 9 shows that FRR=35.6 min will be sufficient time to provide acceptable level of risk only for 
5% of cases of hydrogen-powered cars accidents with fire across London. To be sure that the acceptable 
level of risk is reached for 95% of accidents within London, the required FRR should be at least 52.9 
min. To better understand the effect of population density uncertainty on the risk value, Fig. 9 
demonstrates the risk as a function of FRR and uncertainty of population density distribution for a 
hydrogen-powered vehicle accident with a localised fire in London. 
 
Figure 9. The risk as a function of FRR and uncertainty of population density distribution for a 
hydrogen-powered vehicle accident with a localised fire. 
The carried out QRA shows that typical for today’s onboard storage tanks in hydrogen-powered vehicles 
with FRR=8 min [12] cannot provide acceptable level of risk in densely populated areas like London. 
To provide the acceptable level of risk 1.0 ∙ 10−5 (for 95% of accidents in a city with a similar 
population to London’s population density) the onboard hydrogen storage systems should have FRR of 
at least 52.9 min.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Hydrogen-powered vehicles have already hit the roads. The stakeholders, including the public, should 
be informed on the acceptable level of state-of-the-art preventions and mitigations of specific hazards 
and associated risks. Considering the previously “missed” risks due to insufficient knowledge of hazards 
of blast wave and fireball during the catastrophic rupture of a tank in a fire, it is to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, that this is the first publicly available QRA of onboard hydrogen storage of hydrogen-
powered vehicles applied to roads in London. This paves the way to inherently safer design of the 
vehicles. This underlines the significance of the study for the deployment of hydrogen systems and 
infrastructure in addressing problems of climate change, environmental protection, shortage of fossil 
fuels and independence of energy supply.  
The risk is assessed here by both, fatality per vehicle per year and as cost per accident with a vehicle 
fire. The originality of this study is based on the merging of contemporary probabilistic and deterministic 
methods in engineering to achieve synergies through their complementarities. For the first time, the 
QRA analysis includes the use of innovative validated engineering tools to consider previously “missed” 
hazards such as a blast wave and fireball following the tank rupture in a fire.  
The authors have made all possible efforts to underpin the rigour of this study by using the most recent 
relevant data from a variety of safety science and engineering sources. The described QRA methodology 
is applied to a hypothetical accident with a fire on London roads with a hydrogen-powered vehicle 
having a 62.2 litre hydrogen tank capacity at storage pressure of 70 MPa. The QRA is based on available 
statistical data on car accidents and vehicle fires in the UK. The cost associated with an accident was 
determined by using the numbers available from the Health and Safety Executive (UK). TPRD failure 
frequency is taken as the conservative characteristic values for failure rate of pressure relief devices 
available from industry and European hydrogen project FireComp.  
The study has demonstrated that the assumed thermally unprotected composite onboard storage tank, 
which FRR is typically 6-12 min, has the risk of human life loss in an accident escalating to a fire and 
consequently the tank rupture of 3.14 ∙ 10−3. This is two and half orders of magnitude larger than the 
acceptable level of risk of 1.00 ∙ 10−5. The cost associated with loss of life in the accident in this case 
is 4.03M £/accident.  
The study has demonstrated that the increase of FRR of onboard storage can drastically decrease the 
risk of hydrogen-powered vehicles to the acceptable level or even bring it to negligible level if 
engineering solutions such as thermal protection means for composite tanks for high-pressure hydrogen 
storage are applied. 
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